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CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS FOR THE RULE 
OF LAW: A VISION FOR THE POST-MONARCHY 
JUDICIARY IN NEPAL 
DAVID PIMENTEL

 
ABSTRACT 
A new government has taken power in Nepal. Intent on replacing the 
monarchical Hindu state with a secular democracy, it has promised a new 
constitution. Although the Nepali government is currently operating under 
an Interim Constitution, it remains to be seen what the post-monarchy 
judiciary will look like. Those involved in the drafting should pay careful 
attention to how specific provisions for court governance will impact both 
institutional and decisional judicial independence. The Interim 
Constitution calls for a judicial council but not a sufficiently independent 
one. The Interim Constitution also allows broad exercise of emergency 
powers, depriving the courts of jurisdiction over the legality or 
constitutionality of such exercises—a particularly disturbing flaw given 
the history of abuse of emergency powers in Nepal. These, along with an 
array of other concerns that otherwise threaten to undermine the 
independence and effectiveness of the third branch of government in 
Nepal, can and should be corrected in the new constitution. This Article 
sets forth those concerns and suggests solutions for each. Nepal‟s 
prospects for the rule of law may depend on how well the new 
constitution‟s drafters follow this punch-list of issues and principles as 
they establish the constitutional framework for the new Nepali judiciary. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Nepal is in a state of transition.
1
 A new government has taken power, 
intent on replacing the monarchical Hindu state with a secular democracy,
2
 
and has promised a new constitution to effect these changes.
3
 What 
follows herein is a brief summary of the historical context for the 
initiative, particularly as it applies to the Nepali judiciary, and then an 
open letter to the Constitutional Drafting Committee (―CDC‖) with 
general advice for judicial reform in Nepal.
4
  
Against the backdrop of Nepal‘s political and constitutional history, 
including the content of the present Interim Constitution, there is particular 
concern for the independence of the Nepali judiciary. While the Maoists 
have called for a judiciary more ―accountable to the people,‖ the related 
proposal for judicial elections is deeply flawed and a poor avenue toward 
judicial independence.
5
 Instead, the constitution must include a system of 
 
 
 1. India Hopes for Democratic Transition, Political Consensus in Nepal, UNITED NEWS OF 
INDIA, Apr. 5, 2009, http://hamrolagani.com/home.php?f=Media/NewsDetail&id=275&category= 
News.  
 2. Id.  
 3. PM‟s Worry about Local Issues, KANTIPUR REPORT, May 26, 2009, http://www.kantipur 
online.com/kolnews.php?&nid=196108 (Nepal‘s new Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, in his first 
meeting with the Secretaries of Government, ―told them that the prime responsibility of this 
government was to draft a new constitution and bring the peace process to a logical end.‖); see also 
infra note 34. 
 4. Jörg Luther & Domenico Francavilla, Nepal‟s Constitutional Transition 2 (Working Paper 
No. 93, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017642.  
 5. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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judicial governance (including judicial selection, promotion, discipline, 
and administration) that is distanced from the political forces that would 
otherwise corrupt it: a system founded upon an independent judicial 
council. Institutional independence will also require some new provisions 
dealing with judiciary budgets, emergency powers, and annual reporting 
from the third branch of government. Ensuring decisional independence—
the freedom individual judges have in rendering their judgments—will 
require other constitutional provisions dealing with life tenure, 
compensation, discipline and removal, and judicial immunity. Access to 
justice requires the retention of small courts in rural and remote areas, 
particularly given the efficient and responsive dispute resolution done 
there. These can be administered on a regional basis. Finally, the new 
system will require a thorough vetting of judges to root out existing 
corruption, as well as an effective accountability mechanism for policing 
the integrity of the system in the future. 
There is great potential for Nepal‘s future with respect to the rule of 
law, but establishing the proper constitutional framework for the Nepali 
judiciary will be a necessary first step in realizing that potential. The 
recommendations herein are focused on creating that framework and 
maximizing prospects for success in this endeavor. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY IN NEPAL 
Nepali governance has a rich and complex history starting with the 
unification of Nepal in the mid-eighteenth century under Gurkha King 
Prithvi Narayan Shah.
6
 By the mid-nineteenth century, the Ranas had 
seized power in the role of Prime Minister, a title which was passed down 
in the Rana family line. The Rana regime was authoritarian, with the 
Bharadari Sabha (or Assembly of Lords) functioning as no more than a 
consultative body that effectively rubber-stamped the rule of the Rana.
7
  
A. Nepal Constitution Act of 1948 
The first law resembling a constitution in Nepal was the Government 
of Nepal Constitution Act of 1948, commissioned by liberal Prime 
Minister Padma Shamsher Rana.
8
 However, the result was a constitution in 
 
 
 6. BBC News, Timeline: Nepal, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1166 
516.stm (last visited Oct. 14, 2009) [hereinafter BBC News Timeline]. 
 7. Enayetur Rahim, Nepal: Government and Politics, in NEPAL AND BHUTAN: COUNTRY 
STUDIES 143, 146–47 (3d ed. 1993).  
 8. Id. at 147. 
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form more than in substance. It created a bicameral legislature, with the 
entire membership of one house and a majority of the other appointed by 
the Prime Minister, and with the Prime Minister retaining power to veto 
any legislatively adopted measure.
9
 This token gesture to constitutionalism 
lasted only a few months until anti-Rana rebels joined the monarchy to 
overthrow the Rana system.
10
 
B. Interim Constitution of 1951 
A new Interim Constitution was adopted in 1951, reasserting the king‘s 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers.
11
 While this constitution 
created a putative legislative body, the Constituent Assembly‘s power was 
purely advisory, with the king retaining ultimate power.
12
 Pressure for 
more democratic and representative government prompted King Mahendra 
to grant a new constitution in 1959.
13
 
C. Royal Constitution of 1959 
The Royal Constitution of 1959 created a multi-party parliamentary 
system modeled on those of Britain and India, but which retained 
enormous power in the king, including broad emergency powers to 
suspend both houses of parliament and the constitution itself.
14
 When 
these powers were invoked by King Mahendra after party elections in 
1960 to dissolve the government, the pre-1959 constitutional system was 
revived.
15
 
D. Panchayat Constitution of 1962 
King Mahendra issued a new constitution in 1962, abolishing all 
political parties, and drawing on the ancient panchayat system for the 
structure of local and regional government.
16
 While recognizing local 
councils, or panchayat, the 1962 Panchayat Constitution contained even 
stronger assertions of royal power than the previous constitutions.
17
 Once 
 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 148. 
 12. Id. at 147–48.  
 13. Id. at 148. 
 14. Id. at 148–49. 
 15. Id. at 149. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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again, the king retained unilateral power to suspend the constitution during 
emergencies, as well as the power to amend the constitution.
18
 This 
amendment power was invoked periodically over the years in response to 
agitation for a more democratic government, which reached a head in 
1990.
19
 
E. Constitution of 1990 
Pro-democracy protests, from both the right and the left, ultimately 
prompted the monarchy to make concessions in a new constitution in 
1990.
20
 This constitution brought back a multi-party parliamentary system, 
and for the first time, granted elected officials genuine power independent 
of the king.
21
 However, the 1990 Constitution left the door open to 
significant assertions of royal authority, including the invocation of 
emergency powers.
22
  
By 1995, Maoist rebels were organizing in rural areas, protesting the 
monarchy, and calling for a ―people‘s republic.‖23 The insurrection 
became increasingly violent over the next ten years, contributing to 
political instability in the elected government. In 2001, King Gyanendra 
declared a state of emergency and sent the army to fight the Maoist 
insurgency.
24
 Attempts to negotiate a peace failed in 2003, and ultimately, 
in 2005 the King invoked emergency power and assumed full control of 
the government.
25
  
F. Interim Constitution of 2007 
In April 2006, King Gyanendra, under intense political pressure, 
reinstated parliament, and the following month, the parliament voted 
unanimously to curtail royal power.
26
 Shortly thereafter, a peace 
agreement was reached with the Maoists, and they were, in turn, invited to 
participate in an interim government.
27
 The new government immediately 
moved to replace the 1990 Constitution. Plans were announced to draft 
 
 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 150–52; BBC News Timeline, supra note 6.  
 20. BBC News Timeline, supra note 6.  
 21. Rahim, supra note 7, at 152. 
 22. Id. at 155. 
 23. BBC News Timeline, supra note 6. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/4
  
 
 
 
 
2010] POST-MONARCHY JUDICIARY IN NEPAL 289 
 
 
 
 
and adopt an entirely new constitution—one that stripped the monarchy of 
power and created a federalist, secular state.
28
 In the meantime, an Interim 
Constitution was adopted.
29
 This document currently serves as the 
Constitution of Nepal, and apparently will continue to do so until a more 
permanent constitution can be formed and approved. 
G. Status of the New Constitution 
While circumstances change on almost a daily basis, the new 
constitution is still—at publication of this Article—unbegun. Elections in 
2008 produced a coalition government led by Maoists, with support from 
Marxist-Leninists.
30
 In early 2009, Marxist-Leninist leader, Madhav 
Kumar Nepal, was named to chair the CDC.
31
 However, continuing 
political volatility in the new government has hindered progress on the 
new constitution. 
In May 2009, the new Maoist Prime Minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, 
resigned his post after public protests over his dismissal of the army chief 
due to the chief‘s refusal to integrate Maoist rebels into the military.32 A 
few weeks later, Madhav Kumar Nepal (then chair of the CDC) was 
named to succeed him. Prime Minister Nepal‘s decision to back the army 
chief‘s refusal to integrate the rebels fractured the coalition and caused the 
Maoist party to withdraw from the government.
33
 Prime Minister Nepal, 
now representing a twenty-two-party coalition excluding the Maoists, has 
said that his government‘s goal is to write the new constitution and 
complete the country‘s peace process.34 However, his successor as chair of 
the CDC, Nilambar Acharya, has described the drafting process as being 
 
 
 28. AFP, Nepal‟s Monarchy Abolished, Republic Declared, May 28, 2008, http://afp.google. 
com/article/ALeqM5isOHNx5wqAzoR3Uc79spn-FzvERg (―Nepal‘s fiercely-republican Maoists, who 
fought for 10 years to remove the monarchy and create a secular republic, won the largest single bloc 
of seats in the assembly . . . .‖). 
 29. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2063 (2007), translation available at http://www. 
worldstatesmen.org/Nepal_Interim_Constitution2007.pdf. The Constitution is also referred to by the 
Nepali year of enactment, 2063. 
 30. BBC News Timeline, supra note 6. 
 31. Nepal Govt Partners Corner Maoists for Charter Draft Committee, WEEKLY TELEGRAPH, 
Aug. 14, 2009, http://telegraphnepal.com/news_det.php?news_id=6038 [hereinafter Nepal Govt 
Partners]. 
 32. BBC News Timeline, supra note 6. 
 33. Id.; Nepal PM Says Sacking Army Chief by Maoist Was A Mistake, UNITED NEWS OF INDIA, 
May 29, 2009, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Nepal%20PM%20says%20sacking%20 
army%20chief%20by%20Maoist%20was%20a%20mistake.-a0200816092.  
 34. Nepal PM Says No Foreign Hand in Maoist Govt‟s Downfall, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, May 
27, 2009, available at http://65.182.162.202/story/53890.  
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in ―cold storage,‖35 as controversy continues over the role Maoists may yet 
play in the process.
36
 
While it remains to be seen when and how the drafting of the new 
constitution for Nepal will take place, the country appears poised to move 
forward.
37
 It is timely, therefore, to comment on what should be included 
in that constitution.  
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE JUDICIARY IN NEPAL 
The Nepali judiciary appears to have little to recommend it at present. 
Although there are some impressive examples of the Nepali Supreme 
Court asserting its independence,
38
 this does not appear to be the norm for 
the judiciary as a whole. Indeed, the political history of Nepal depicts 
remarkable centralization of power in kings or prime ministers, which 
continued substantially even under the 1990 Constitution.
39
 Moreover, 
there is a perception of widespread corruption in the judiciary, which the 
Nepali bar has been quick to condemn.
40
  
 
 
 35. Interview by Myrepublica.com with Nilambar Acharya, Chairman, Constitutional Committee 
of the Constituent Assembly of Nepal, transcript available at Thira L. Bhusal & Post B. Basnet, 
Constitution-Drafting in Cold Storage, http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_ 
details&news_id=11808 (Nov. 15, 2009). 
 36. Nepal Govt Partners, supra note 31. 
 37.  
Constituent Assembly (CA) Chairman Subash Chandra Nemwang on Thursday [February 4, 
2010] said that the new constitution will be prepared within the stipulated deadline . . . . The 
CA chair, however, said that the political parties are still not really serious towards timely 
constitution drafting and urged them to focus more on this important task.  
Constitution Writing to Commence from Today: CA Chair, NEPALNEWS.COM, Feb. 4, 2010, http:// 
www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/2-political/3957-constitution-writing-to-commence-
from-today-ca-chair.html. 
 38. Freedom in the World 2008—Nepal, FREEDOM HOUSE, July 2, 2008, http://www.unhcr. 
org/refworld/docid/487ca22e8.html (―The Supreme Court is a generally conservative institution, and is 
largely independent of the new government. The court filed several petitions in 2006 appealing 
Parliament‘s decision to revoke the monarchy‘s powers.‖). 
 39. Semanta Dahal, Post Conflict Constitution Making in Nepal: Towards „Inclusiveness‟ in 
Democracy 18 (Nat‘l Law Sch. of India Univ., Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1300132 (―The 1990 Constitution of Nepal acknowledged the country to be ‗multi-ethnic and 
multilingual‘. Yet it described the state as indivisible and sovereign and created a highly centralised 
government.‖).  
 40. Krisha Prasad Bhandari, Formal Justice Too Costly in Nepal, NEPAL MONITOR, May 25, 
2007, http://www.nepalmonitor.com/2007/05/formal_justice_too_costly_in_nepal.html (―The active 
Nepal Bar Association frequently castigated the [Supreme] [C]ourt for its supine verdicts during the 
period of direct rule . . . .‖); NEPAL: SC Punishes the Messenger, DAILY STAR, Sept. 27, 2008, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/law/2008/09/04/corridor.htm (―[T]he judicial system of Nepal . . . like all 
other sectors of Nepalese society, has a reputation of being corrupt . . . . Recently, the [Nepal Bar 
Association] decided to fight corruption in the judiciary . . . .‖); Kathleen Hwang, Human Rights in 
Decline in Asia, UPI.COM, Jan. 18, 2006, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/ 
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At the same time, justice has been carried out on the local level in 
panchayat bodies, which is similarly problematic. Under the Panchayat 
Constitution, the court system was headed by the Supreme Court, followed 
by zonal courts, which oversaw numerous district courts throughout the 
country.
41
 These courts were considered independent; however, they 
―never were assertive in challenging the king or his ministers.‖42  
When the Maoists came to power, they established ―People‘s Courts‖ 
in the villages to bring effective and efficient dispute resolution to those 
who may not have had meaningful access to justice in the past.
43
 These 
People‘s Courts have been controversial: on the one hand, they have been 
very effective in providing prompt and inexpensive means for the 
resolution of local disputes, particularly in remote and rural areas; on the 
other hand, they are not perceived as upholding the highest principles of 
justice.
44
  
Weaknesses in the judiciary are not necessarily rooted in issues of 
constitutional structure, however. With this in mind, it is difficult to 
imagine that the problems plaguing the Nepali judiciary can be fixed 
simply through drafting a new constitution. The gap between the 
provisions of the law—the guarantees articulated in a constitution—and 
the real-world functioning of a judicial system is difficult to bridge. The 
rule of law literature has lamented the fact that so many rule of law reform 
programs begin with constitutional reform, when the constitutional issues 
may be far removed from the most compelling rule of law priorities for a 
post-conflict society.
45
 
 
 
200601/18/Human-rights-in-decline-in-Asia/UPI-65161137606975/ (―‗There has been a complete 
collapse of the rule of law . . . . The judiciary has been infiltrated by the pro-king faction, the Bar 
Association is warring with the courts, and the judges say the king‘s order is the law.‘‖ (quoting 
Mandira Sharma, director of the Advocacy Forum in Katmandu, Nepal)).  
 41. Douglas C. Makeig, Nepal: National Security, in NEPAL & BHUTAN, supra note 7, at 230. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Rekha Shrestha, Eastern Nepal District Said Increasingly Turning to Maoist “People‟s 
Court”, BBC NEWS, May 10, 2004 (―‗About 75 per cent of the cases are being solved by the people‘s 
court.‘‖ (quoting Prakash Shakya, advocate and member of the district bar association)). 
 44. Nepal Govt Asks Maoists to Stop Extortion, Scrap Courts, NEPAL HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, 
July 2, 2006, http://www.nepalhumanrightsnews.com/news.asp?id=387 (―There have been reports that 
the Maoists are punishing people through their people‘s court not only in the remote areas under their 
control but also in the capital.‖). 
 45. JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?: 
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 11 (2006):  
The ―building blocks‖ for the rule of law might be said to be courts, police, prisons, 
legislatures, schools, the press, bar associations, and the like. . . . [T]he institutional building 
blocks on which the rule of law depends are themselves made up of human beings, with their 
own hopes, fears, and attitudes, and this makes creating the institutional aspects of the rule of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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While the focus of this Article is on the constitutional provisions 
themselves, it would be naïve to presume that adoption of the right 
constitution will solve the judiciary‘s problems, much less establish the 
rule of law in Nepal. Nonetheless, ill-designed or ill-conceived 
constitutional provisions can certainly hinder meaningful judicial reform. 
The constitutional structure of the judiciary may well provide a foundation 
for future judicial development, including the promise of an independent 
judiciary that can promote the rule of law. 
The Interim Constitution now in effect is a reasonably sound starting 
point for discussion of the provisions of a new constitution for Nepal. It is 
a vast improvement over the 1990 Constitution, which preserved 
monarchical power and the central role of Hindu religion in government. 
Those two provisions provided much of the basis for the Maoist rebellion 
that tore the country apart over a ten-year period.
46
 The Interim 
Constitution rejects those two principles and attempts to approximate the 
values and priorities that prevail in Nepali society and in the coalition 
government. Accordingly, it provides the best basis for commentary on 
what should be included in the new constitution. This Article will address 
those provisions that relate to the judiciary.  
Of course, given the political exigencies associated with the adoption 
of an Interim Constitution, including extreme urgency to get it in place and 
all the compromises necessary to secure sufficient consensus, the resulting 
document is far from ideal. Without criticizing those involved in the 
drafting of the Interim Constitution, who would undoubtedly agree that it 
is imperfect,
47
 it is timely to revisit its provisions relating to the judiciary 
in order to consider how to advise the CDC on what should be retained or 
rejected in Nepal‘s new constitution.  
IV. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS—A FLAWED CONCEPT 
There is, of course, the classic tension between judicial independence 
and judicial accountability. Recent rhetoric from the Maoists, whose rise 
 
 
law as complex as any other venture that relies on mobilizing multiple individuals in a 
common enterprise. 
 46. HIMALAYAN PEOPLE‘S WAR: NEPAL'S MAOIST REBELLION 5 (Michael Hutt ed., 2004) (The 
Maoists‘ demands included ―a secular state free of all discrimination and oppression with the 
monarchy stripped of its privileges.‖). 
 47. Interview with Jenik Radon, Attorney, Radon & Ishizumi and Adjunct Asst. Professor, 
Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs, in Kathmandu, Nepal (Feb. 14, 
2009). 
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to power coincided with the fall of the monarchy,
48
 suggests that they want 
a judiciary accountable to the people.
49
 This has prompted some 
discussion of the idea of appointing judges by popular election in Nepal. 
The American experience with judicial elections, however, has not borne 
out the wisdom of that approach to judicial selection. 
While rule of law reformers have been criticized in the past for 
attempting to export their own legal systems, Americans overwhelmingly 
recommend against any replication of their own systems of judicial 
election, in effect in many states of the Union.
50
 The message to the Nepali 
CDC is this: do not resort to electing judges, as you will certainly come to 
regret any venture down this path. 
As Professor Charles Geyh explains, one of the primary problems 
plaguing judicial elections is the ignorance of the voting public;
51
 they 
usually know little or nothing about the judicial candidates on the ballot. 
Typically, the best way to educate the public on its choices for judges is to 
allow the judicial candidates to run campaigns alerting voters to their 
choices and to the differences between the candidates.
52
 Of course, 
contested judicial campaigns raise the specter of fundraising and all the 
corrupting influence that comes with campaign contributions.
53
 
It is worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court recently considered a 
ruling of the Supreme Court of West Virginia, after a litigant spent $3 
million in campaign contributions to get a more sympathetic justice onto 
that court.
54
 The campaign was successful, and the newly elected judge 
then cast the deciding vote to reverse a $50-million judgment against the 
campaign contributor.
55
 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the newly 
elected justice should have recused himself from the case based, if nothing 
 
 
 48. As of May 2009, a new coalition government, excluding the Maoists, was formed. However, 
the Maoists still maintain the largest block of seats in the Constituent Assembly. See supra notes 28–
30 and accompanying text. 
 49. Dahal, supra note 39, at 10 (―After the ousting of the monarch, there was a broad consensus 
reached between the parties and the Maoists on ultimate goals of society and state: sovereignty of the 
people . . . .‖). 
 50. See discussion accompanying notes 51–56 infra. 
 51. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 54 (2003) (―[A]s 
much as 80% of the electorate is completely unfamiliar with its candidates for judicial office.‖) 
(footnote omitted). 
 52. Id. (―[O]ne might hypothesize that as more money is spent on advertising in judicial races, 
voter ignorance will diminish, but that too is far from clear.‖). 
 53. Id. at 55 (―Eighty percent . . . of the public thinks that campaign contributions buy influence 
with judges.‖). 
 54. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).  
 55. Id. at 2263–64.  
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else, on the problematic perceptions.
56
 Nonetheless, it was a close (5-4) 
decision, which raises very serious concerns about the integrity of the 
judicial system when the judgeships themselves are subject to popular 
vote. 
Fortunately, the Interim Constitution of Nepal does not call for judicial 
elections, but the suggestion has been made, and that alone is disturbing. 
The CDC should certainly reject that suggestion. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, BOTH 
INSTITUTIONAL AND DECISIONAL 
There is no cognizable history or culture of judicial independence in 
Nepal based on its judicial history.
57
 But to appreciate the structural basis 
for judicial independence, it is important to distinguish (1) institutional 
independence, which is the independence of the judicial branch as a whole 
from interference by the other branches of government, from (2) 
decisional independence, which is the freedom of the individual judge 
from improper influences in deciding her or his cases.
58
 
The key to institutional independence is the establishment of a 
governing body to oversee the judiciary—a body that is not under the 
control of the executive branch or, for that matter, the legislature. 
Separation of powers is a precursor to institutional independence. 
Bangladesh achieved this type of de jure separation of the judiciary from 
the executive with constitutional amendments in late 2007.
59
 Whether or 
not formal checks and balances are in place, the judiciary cannot be an 
independent branch of government unless it is governed by a body that 
stands on its own power. 
A. Institutional Judicial Independence—The Judicial Council 
The Interim Constitution of Nepal calls for the creation of a Judicial 
Council vested with power over the judiciary.
60
 The concept of a council 
 
 
 56. Id.  
 57. See supra Part I, for a summary of Nepali history; see also James Heitzman, Nepal: 
Historical Setting, in NEPAL AND BHUTAN, supra note 7, at 3–48. 
 58. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 
386 (2006) (―[I]t is common to distinguish decisional independence from institutional and other 
components of judicial independence.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 59. K.M. Mukta, Judges Should Get Better Emoluments, NEW NATION, Feb. 5, 2009, http:// 
nation.ittefaq.com/issues/2009/02/05/news0460.htm. It is not clear yet whether this structural change 
has resulted in de facto separation, or in true institutional independence. 
 60. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2063 art. 113 (2007).  
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to govern the judiciary is salutary. Indeed, the adoption of judicial councils 
to govern judicial systems has been characterized as ―an international ‗best 
practice‘ designed to help ensure judicial independence and external 
accountability.‖61  
The emerging consensus in favor of entrusting judicial governance to 
judicial councils is manifest in the widespread adoption of such 
institutions throughout the world. Presently an estimated sixty percent of 
the world‘s judiciaries are governed by such councils, up from ten percent 
at the end of the 1970s.
62
 Various international organizations have 
endorsed the concept in separate declarations, not always using the name 
―judicial council,‖ but nonetheless declaring that judicial appointments 
and oversight should be done by an independent body composed mostly of 
judges: 
Universal Charter of the Judge—―[S]election should be carried out 
by an independent body, that include[s] substantial judicial 
representation.‖63 ―[J]udicial administration and disciplinary action 
should be carried out by independent bodies, that include substantial 
judicial representation.‖64 
Beijing Principles—States that the body entrusted with the 
appointment of judges ―should include representatives [of] the 
higher Judiciary and the independent legal profession as a means of 
ensuring that judicial competence, integrity and independence are 
maintained.‖65 
 
 
 61. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial 
Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 104 (2009). 
 62. Id. at 105.  
 63. Universal Charter of the Judge, art. 9 (1999), available at http://www.hjpc.ba/dc/pdf/THE% 
20UNIVERSAL%20CHARTER%20OF%20THE%20JUDGE.pdf. The Charter has been approved by 
the member associations of the International Association of Judges and was unanimously approved by 
the delegates attending the meeting of the Central Council of the International Association of Judges in 
Taipei, Taiwan on November 17, 1999, Judicial Independence Minerva Research Group, International 
Dokumente, http://www.mpil.de/ww/de/pub/forschung/forschung_im_detail/projekte/minerva_richterl 
_unabh/intdocs.htm. 
 64. Id. art. 11. 
 65. Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA 
Region, art. 15 (amended 1997), available at http://www.asianlii.org/asia/other/CCJAPRes/1995/ 
1.html.  
The Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary finds its origins in 
1982 in a statement of principles formulated by the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific 
(LAWASIA) Human Rights Standing Committee and a small number of Chief Justices and 
other Judges at a meeting in Tokyo (―the Tokyo Principles‖). The decision to formulate the 
current Statement was made at the 4th Conference of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific in 
Perth, Western Australia in 1991. . . . [A] first draft . . . was presented to the 5th Conference 
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Latimer House Guidelines (for Commonwealth Countries)—
―[A]ppointments should be made by a judicial services commission 
(established by the Constitution or by statute) . . . .‖66 
Council of Europe Recommendation—―The authority taking the 
decision on the selection and career of judges should be 
independent of the government and the administration. In order to 
safeguard its independence, rules should ensure that, for instance, 
its members are selected by the judiciary and that the authority 
decides itself on its procedural rules.‖67 
European Charter on the Statute for Judges—―In respect of every 
decision affecting the selection, recruitment, appointment, career 
progress or termination of office of a judge, the statute envisages 
the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and 
legislative powers within which at least one half of those who sit are 
 
 
in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1993. In light of comments received at that conference and 
subsequently, and following further consideration at the conference in Beijing in August 
1995, the Statement of Principles was adopted by the Chief Justices from 20 countries in the 
Asia Pacific. A revised version of the Statement . . . was adopted in its final form at the 7th 
Conference of the Chief Justices in Manila in August 1997. The Statement has now been 
signed and subscribed to by 32 countries in the Asia Pacific region. 
David K. Malcolm, Foreword to Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary 
in the LAWASIA Region (amended 1997). 
 66. Latimer House Guidelines for the Commonwealth, art. 2 (1998), available at http://www. 
arablegalportal.org/criminal-laws/Images/CodeLink/32.pdf.  
 A Joint Colloquium on “Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence . . . 
towards a Commonwealth Model” was held at Latimer House in the United Kingdom, from 
15–19 June 1998. Over 60 participants attended representing 20 Commonwealth countries 
and 3 overseas territories. . . .  
 . . . . 
 The following Guidelines for the Commonwealth are a result of deliberations during the 
Colloquium and subsequent discussions. The Guidelines were considered by Commonwealth 
Law Ministers in 1999 and were referred by them to Senior Officials who discussed the 
Guidelines at their meeting in London in November 2001. They “noted that the principles of 
good governance and judicial independence had been clearly endorsed by Commonwealth 
Heads of Government and welcomed the general thrust of the declaration of those principles 
in the Guidelines”. . . .  
 . . . . 
 The Guidelines were also considered by the Law Ministers and Attorney Generals of 
Small Commonwealth Jurisdictions Meeting in May 2000, where the Guidelines were 
welcomed as “reflecting valuable and fundamental concepts”. 
Id. at 2. 
 67. Council Recommendation No. R(94) 12 of 13 Oct. 1994, principle I, § 2 (c) [hereinafter 
Council of Europe Recommendation], available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/administrative_law_and_justice/texts_&_documents/Conv_Rec_Res/Recommendation(94)1
2.asp.  
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judges elected by their peers following methods guaranteeing the 
widest representation of the judiciary.‖68 
Palermo Declaration—―The Supreme Council of Magistrates is 
entrusted with the administration and discipline of the judiciary. It 
guarantees the independence of magistrates. It provides for 
recruitment, decides the assignment of magistrates and organizes 
professional training.‖69 
 There is a similar theme in all of these declarations. In order for the 
judicial council to serve its principal purpose—to first and foremost 
safeguard judicial independence—the council itself must be removed from 
the executive‘s sphere of influence and empowered to act on its own. But 
the mere existence of a judicial council is not enough; an ill-conceived 
judicial council may do more harm than good. In their paper, ―Global Best 
Practices: Judicial Councils,‖ which is one of the most important studies 
on the subject, Violaine Autheman and Sandra Elena concluded: 
The Judicial Council, like the judiciary itself, is an important 
institution that should be structured and operate in a transparent, 
accountable manner. . . . [A]nother key finding of our research is 
that [judicial councils] may serve more as a barrier than as an 
avenue to judicial independence and accountability, particularly in 
countries where corruption is systemic or the judiciary is controlled 
by the executive.
70
 
 The caution in the latter finding is particularly important for Nepal. 
The provisions of the Interim Constitution fail to provide an adequate 
buffer from executive influence. Accordingly, the Judicial Council, as 
presently constituted, is unlikely to further the goals of judicial 
independence and accountability, and may well serve as a barrier to the 
same. 
 
 
 68. European Charter on the Statute for Judges, art. 1.3 (1998) (drafted by the Council of 
Europe), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/legal_professionals/ 
judges/instruments_and_documents/charte%20eng.pdf.  
 69. The Palermo Declaration is a draft additional protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, articulating a model for the elements of a judiciary statute, which calls for the creation 
of a ―Supreme Council of Magistrates.‖ Elements of a European Statute on the Judiciary, Palermo 
Declaration, § 3.1 (1993) (issued by the European Association of Magistrates for Democracy and 
Freedoms) [hereinafter Palermo Declaration], available at http://medel.bugiweb.com/usr/Palermo.pdf. 
 70. Abstract to VIOLAINE AUTHEMAN & SANDRA ELENA, GLOBAL BEST PRACTICES: JUDICIAL 
COUNCILS, LESSONS LEARNED FROM EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (Keith Henderson ed., 2004), 
available at http://www.ifes.org/publication/eae6b5d089d0b287174df2742875b515/WhitePaper_2_ 
FINAL.pdf. 
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1. Present Provisions for the Judicial Council 
The Interim Constitution calls for a Judicial Council (―Council‖) 
composed of five members: 
 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as Chairperson; 
 the senior-most Judge of the Supreme Court; 
 the Minister of Justice; 
 a senior advocate, appointed by the Chief Justice on 
recommendation of the Nepal Bar Association; and 
 another jurist appointed by the Prime Minister.
71
 
 It is not clear, however, to what degree these five are in a position to 
exert significant power in the appointment and oversight of judges. They 
are empowered to ―make recommendations and give advice . . . 
concerning the appointment of, transfer of, disciplinary action against, and 
dismissal of Judges and other matters relating to judicial administration 
. . . .‖72 This phrasing is disturbingly weak, as ―recommendations‖ and 
―advice‖ can presumably be ignored. On the other hand, when a Chief 
Justice is empowered to act ―on recommendation‖ of the Judicial 
Council,
73
 it could be inferred that she or he is powerless to act absent such 
recommendation. The present provisions are too vague to ensure such 
interpretation; nothing in the Interim Constitution unambiguously 
establishes the power and authority of the Judicial Council over judiciary 
affairs as a governing body, not merely an advisory one.  
2. Role of the Judicial Council—Appointment  
The Judicial Council appears to play a significant role in the judicial 
appointment process, as the Chief Justice is empowered to appoint other 
judges of the Supreme Court as well as judges of the appellate courts and 
district courts ―on recommendation of the Judicial Council.‖74 Indeed, it 
appears that the Judicial Council is responsible for administration of a 
―written and oral examination‖ to be used to identify qualified candidates 
for judicial appointment
75
 and to vet candidates, while considering ―inter 
 
 
 71. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2063 art. 113 (2007). 
 72. Id. art. 113, § 1. 
 73. Id. art. 103, § 1; art. 109, § 1. 
 74. Id. art. 109, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. art. 109, § 4. 
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alia, qualification, capacity, experience, dedication and contribution to 
justice, reputation in public life, [and] high moral character‖ before 
making recommendations for appointment.
76
 
This provision appropriately allocates responsibility for screening 
judicial candidates to the Council. The ―on recommendation of‖ language, 
however, raises questions about the Council‘s role in making the final 
selection and appointment.  
3. Role of the Judicial Council—Discipline and Removal  
The Interim Constitution also emphasizes the Judicial Council‘s role in 
disciplinary proceedings, including the power to obtain case files related to 
complaints lodged against judges
77
 and the power to ―constitute a 
Committee of Inquiry‖ if detailed, expert investigation is required in a 
judicial misconduct matter.
78
 This appears to be an expansive role, 
although there is nothing to suggest that the Council‘s ultimate 
determination in a disciplinary matter will be anything more than a 
―recommendation‖ to the Chief Justice. 
As for the most serious discipline—removal of judges—article 109, 
section 10(c) speaks more specifically, saying that a judge may be  
removed by the Chief Justice in accordance with a decision of the 
Judicial Council for his/her removal for reasons of incompetence, 
misbehavior or failure to discharge the duties of his/her office in 
good faith, incapable to discharge the duties due to physical or 
mental condition, or deviation to justice.
79
 
 Of particular interest here is the use of the word ―decision‖ to 
describe the Judicial Council‘s determination, rather than mere ―advice‖ or 
―recommendation‖ as provided in article 113, section 1.80 This suggests 
that the Chief Justice‘s role in carrying out Council determinations (at 
least on the issue of removal) may be merely ministerial, rather than 
discretionary. But the ambiguity persists, particularly given the 
 
 
 76. Id. art. 109, § 5. 
 77. Id. art. 113, § 4. 
 78. Id. art. 113, § 5. See also id. art. 109, § 10(c). 
 The Judge of the Appellate Court and District Court who is facing charge [sic] pursuant 
to this sub-clause shall be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself/herself; and for 
this purpose, the Judicial Council may constitute a ―Committee of Inquiry‖ for the purposes 
of recording the statement of the Judge, collecting evidence and submitting its findings 
thereof. 
 79. Id. art. 109, § 10(c) (emphasis added). 
 80. Text accompanying supra note 72. 
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inconsistency between articles 109 and 113, leaving the judiciary 
vulnerable. Unless the respective roles of the Chief Justice and the Judicial 
Council are clarified, there is potential for conflict and a corresponding 
constitutional crisis, if and when the Chief Justice chooses to disregard the 
―recommendations‖ or ―decisions‖ of the Judicial Council.  
4. Role of the Judicial Council—Other Responsibilities 
The Interim Constitution is clear that the Judicial Council must be 
―consulted‖ before judges are assigned to other tasks, such as ―work 
concerning judicial inquiry or to legal or judicial investigation or research 
. . . .‖81 This ―consultation‖ language is the weakest of all, since it does not 
even call for a recommendation of the Judicial Council, and therefore 
suggests no legal, political, or moral obligation to heed the Council‘s 
views.  
Transfers of judges from one court to another, in contrast, are done ―on 
recommendation of‖ the Judicial Council.82 This language suggests a 
larger role for the Council in transfer decisions than in assignments to 
other tasks. 
The catch-all provision in article 113, section 1 states that the Judicial 
Council shall ―make recommendations and give advice . . . concerning . . . 
other matters relating to judicial administration . . . .‖83 Given the 
vagueness of this language, the Interim Constitution is not entirely clear 
what role the Judicial Council may play in the larger budget process. A 
case can be made that the Judicial Council should be directly involved in 
budgeting, at the very least drawing up and submitting proposed budgets 
 
 
 81. Id. art. 110, § 1. The Chief Justice or Judges of the Supreme Court, as well as the Appellate 
and District Judges: 
shall not be . . . transferred to, engaged in or deputed to any assignment except that [in the 
post] of a Judge.  
 Provided that the Government of Nepal may, in consultation with the Judicial Council, 
depute . . . a Judge of the Appellate Court and the District Court to work concerning judicial 
inquiry, or to any legal or judicial investigation or research, or to any other work of national 
concern. 
Id. 
 In the case of Appellate and District judges, the Chief Justice ―in consultation with the Judicial 
Council‖ may depute them to these projects, including ―election works.‖ Id. 
 82. The Chief Justice also has power ―on the recommendation of the Judicial Council‖ to transfer 
Appellate or District Judges from one court to another. Id. art. 110, § 2 (emphasis added). It should be 
noted that such ―transfers‖ are not mere housekeeping issues. The power to transfer can be abused, and 
judicial independence can be threatened when judges fear retaliatory transfers to remote or undesirable 
locations in response to unpopular decisions they may render. If the transfer power can be used by 
political actors to intimidate or punish judges, judicial independence cannot be assured. 
 83. Id. art. 113, § 1. 
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to the Ministry of Finance and the legislature. The Interim Constitution 
may permit the Council to play such a role, but does not require the 
Council to do so. Accordingly, the legislature and Ministry of Finance 
may well choose to reject any involvement from the judiciary in 
establishing budgets.  
5. Strengthening the Judicial Council—Clear Delegation of Power 
As noted above, it is unclear how much authority the Judicial Council 
has to take final action on its own; the Interim Constitution appears to 
reserve ultimate appointment and removal authority for the Chief Justice, 
who may receive advice, recommendations, and even decisions of the 
Judicial Council, but ultimately makes the appointment
84
 or effects the 
removal personally.
85
 Autheman and Elena explain: 
 The real powers of a Judicial Council may be limited by the 
legal weight accorded to its decisions. If it renders only advisory 
opinions, it may become powerless, and the deciding authority may 
choose to disregard its opinion. The responsibilities undertaken by 
the Council with regard to the appointment process may vary from 
an advisory opinion or the elaboration of a list of potential 
candidates to a mandatory consultation or legally binding 
decisions.
86
 
 The new constitution should avoid vesting too much power in one 
person, a concern about which a post-monarchical society should be 
particularly sensitive. Ideally, therefore, these provisions should be 
redrafted to vest power directly in the Judicial Council. The Chief Justice 
is the chair of the Judicial Council, so all appointments, discipline, 
removals of judges, as well as other important administrative decisions 
 
 
 84. Id. art. 109, § 1. 
 85. Id. art. 109, § 10(c). 
 86. AUTHEMAN & ELENA, supra note 70, at 7. 
In the appointment of judges, Judicial Councils may have varying powers, ranging from no 
role at all to actual appointment powers: 
 No role—Canada, Denmark 
 Purely advisory—Panama, Poland, Slovakia 
 Proposal of candidates for selection (non-binding)—Guatemala (lower court) 
 Proposal of candidates for selection (binding)—France (higher courts) 
 Proposal of candidates for ratification—El Salvador 
 Actual appointment—Bulgaria, Dominican Republic (Supreme Court). 
Id. 
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over the judicial branch, e.g., adoption of budgets and promulgation of 
rules, would be executed over his or her signature anyway. However, the 
constitution should make it clear that these are the actions of the entire 
body and not of an individual who may or may not choose to follow the 
recommendations of the Judicial Council.
87
 
6. Strengthening the Judicial Council—Broadened and Diversified 
Membership 
The other, more serious concern about the provisions for the Judicial 
Council arises because its membership consists of only five individuals, 
three of whom, including the chair, are directly appointed by the Prime 
Minister.
88
 The other two are appointed by the Chief Justice,
89
 who is, in 
turn, appointed by the Prime Minister. This affords the Prime Minister 
exceptional power to shape and influence the judiciary as a whole, offering 
poor safeguards for institutional independence. 
7. Judges on the Council 
If the Judicial Council is to function independently, its membership 
needs to be broader and further removed from the influence of the 
executive branch. The international trend has been to populate judicial 
councils mostly with judges (or magistrates) who already enjoy some 
measure of independence. The Palermo Declaration, for example, calls for 
―[a]t least half of the . . . Council . . . [to be] composed of magistrates,‖90 
and the European Charter insists that ―at least one half of those who sit are 
judges.‖91 Echoing the same principle, the Universal Charter of the Judge 
provides that judicial councils should ―include substantial judicial 
representation.‖92 
 
 
 87. Id. See Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 113 (explaining how the highly paid Chief 
Justice of Singapore wields enormous power over judicial appointments, and speculating that the Chief 
Justice may use this power to ensure that the bench is populated with judges ―known for [their] 
docility in cases of great importance to the ruling party‖).  
 88. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2063 art. 113 (2007). While three members are appointed 
by the Prime Minister, they may not all have been appointed by the same Prime Minister. 
 89. The Judicial Council members appointed by the Chief Justice include the senior-most Judge 
of the Supreme Court (named to that post by the Chief Justice, upon recommendation of the Judicial 
Council) and a senior advocate appointed ―on the recommendation of the Nepal Bar Association.‖ 
INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2063 arts. 103 & 113(c) (2007). 
 90. Palermo Declaration, supra note 69, § 3.2. 
 91. European Charter on the Statute for Judges, supra note 68, art. 1.3. 
 92. Universal Charter of the Judge, supra note 63, art. 9. 
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Brazil typifies the trend—in 2004 it passed a new constitutional 
amendment calling for a judicial council of fifteen: nine judges, two 
prosecutors, two lawyers, and two lay persons appointed by the 
legislature.
93
 In the U.S. federal courts, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States (―JCUS‖), the governing council over the federal judiciary 
as a whole, is composed entirely of judges,
94
 as are the Judicial Councils 
of the various circuits.
95
 
8. Selection of Council Members by Their Fellow Judges 
The issue of strict composition—to what degree the Council is 
dominated by judges—may not be as important as the issue of how the 
Judicial Council members are selected. The Council of Europe similarly 
calls for judicial council members to be ―selected by the judiciary.‖96 The 
district judges on the JCUS are also ―chosen‖ by their fellow judges.97 
Again, both the European Charter and the Palermo Declaration call for the 
judges on the council to be ―elected by their peers,‖ with the latter 
declaring that such election should be ―according to the rule of 
proportional representation.‖98  
The idea here is not so much to give the judges ―representation‖ on the 
Judicial Council or to give these members a specific constituency to serve, 
 
 
 93. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 111 n.35. 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).  
 The Chief Justice of the United States shall summon annually the chief judge of each 
judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge from 
each judicial circuit to a conference at such time and place in the United States as he may 
designate. He shall preside at such conference which shall be known as the Judicial 
Conference of the United States. . . .  
. . . . 
 The district judge to be summoned from each judicial circuit shall be chosen by the 
circuit and district judges of the circuit and shall serve as a member of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States . . . . 
Id. 
 The JCUS does not have any involvement in the appointment of judges, but is limited solely to 
administrative oversight of the judicial branch. In this sense, it is different from the Judicial Councils 
of most states. 
 95. 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)–(b) (2006). Circuit councils have some involvement in the selection and 
appointment of bankruptcy judges and are the primary actors in the judicial discipline system for 
federal judges. 28 U.S.C. §§ 353–354 (2006). 
 96. Council Recommendation No. R(94) 12, supra note 67, principle I, § 2(c). 
 97. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006) (―The district judge to be summoned from each judicial circuit shall 
be chosen by the circuit and district judges of the circuit and shall serve as a member of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States . . . .‖). 
 98. European Charter on the Statute for Judges, supra note 68, § 3.1; Palermo Declaration, supra 
note 69, § 3.2. 
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but to spread out the appointment power, diluting the influence of any one 
actor (particularly a political actor, like the Prime Minister) over the 
judiciary as a whole. This approach will decentralize the appointment 
power and ensure that the persons appointed (and the persons making the 
appointments) are knowledgeable about the courts and invested in the 
integrity of the judiciary.  
The Palermo Declaration, which apparently contemplates an all-judge 
council, allows for legislative selection of some of those judges, stating 
that although a majority of the council membership will be elected by their 
fellow judges, the council ―comprises, besides, personalities appointed by 
parliament . . . appointed for a definite period of time.‖99 Interestingly 
enough, it does not mention the possibility of executive branch 
appointments,
100
 perhaps prompted by the concern that judiciaries already 
suffer too much from executive branch influence. 
9. Representation of Different Levels of Judges 
It is not entirely clear what the Palermo Declaration means by 
―proportional representation,‖ but its mention raises a couple of interesting 
possibilities. One is that there should be representation on the council of 
judges of different levels, including trial judges, appellate judges, and 
Supreme Court justices, and that there should be proportionately more trial 
court judges on the council corresponding to the greater proportion of trial 
court judges in the judicial system. The importance of including the trial 
judges‘ perspective on the council should not be underestimated. Many of 
the most vexing problems a judiciary faces are in the trial courts—indeed, 
this is where most citizens interact with the judicial system. Trial judges 
have also been known to complain that appellate judges are unaware and 
unsympathetic to the practical difficulties that trial judges encounter in 
their work.
101
  
In civil law jurisdictions, however, appellate judges are almost always 
promoted from the ranks of trial judges, meaning anyone on the appellate 
court should retain memory and sympathy for the concerns of the trial 
courts. Even in those jurisdictions, however, there may be value in 
 
 
 99. Palermo Declaration, supra note 69, § 3.2. 
 100. Id.  
 101. The complaint often follows from appellate judges‘ criticizing and overturning trial judge 
decisions—decisions that in the heat of trial, had to be made almost instantaneously (e.g., to sustain or 
overrule an objection), but which the appellate judges have virtually unlimited time to research the 
legal issue and the benefit of hindsight. In any case, the issues and concerns of a trial court are not 
likely to be well represented on a judicial council that includes only appellate judges. 
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diversified judicial representation. A recent examination of judicial 
councils in such countries noted with approval that ―[t]he power of high-
ranking magistrates has been dramatically reduced . . . (as a consequence 
of junior-ranking judges being appointed to the judicial council) . . . .‖102 
Concentrating power in a few high-ranking judges can have other adverse 
consequences for judicial independence when judges feel pressure to 
conform to a particular judicial philosophy shared by the highest-ranking 
judges. This has been cited as a difficulty in Japan, where institutional 
independence is strong, but the decisional independence of the individual 
judges suffers terribly from influence coming from within the judiciary.
103
  
On balance, there are compelling interests to be served by including 
trial judges on the Judicial Council. Making the representation of trial 
judges proportional, however, may tip the balance of power too far in 
favor of the trial judges, and may result in a judicial council that is too 
large.
104
 In the U.S. federal courts, the JCUS and Circuit Councils are 
composed of approximately half trial judges and half appellate judges, 
which gives trial courts significant representation, if not proportional 
representation.
105
 Along similar lines, the Nepali Constitution should 
ensure that the judges on the Judicial Council include a significant 
complement of judges from courts of first instance.  
10. Geographic Representation on the Judicial Council 
The second possibility in the Palermo Declaration‘s language is that 
―proportional representation‖ may be geographical, so different regions or 
provinces may be represented on the Judicial Council in proportion to their 
respective number of judgeships. Given the distinct regions in Nepal and 
the variety of ethnic groups within each of them, it may be advisable to 
require the Judicial Council to include a representative from, for example, 
 
 
 102. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 107.  
 103. David M. O‘Brien & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling Judicial Independence from Within: The 
Japanese Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 37 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O‘Brien eds., 2001). 
 104. Data on the number of judges in Nepal is not readily available, but in California, an area of 
comparable population (both are generally in the range of 30–35 million), ―there are 7 justices in the 
Supreme Court, 105 justices in the Courts of Appeal, and 1,972 judges in the trial courts.‖ Judicial 
Council of California, Questions and Answers, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/qna/qa7.htm (last visited 
July 3, 2009). A proportional representation scheme would require one Supreme Court Justice, fifteen 
appellate court judges, and 282 trial court judges. Even if proportionality were required for only the 
latter two categories, the council would consist of one appellate court judge, and nineteen trial court 
judges. The result would be a council that would be too large to function effectively and that, even if it 
could, would leave the legitimate interests of the appellate courts significantly under-represented.  
 105. 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332(a)–(b) (2006). 
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each of five provinces.
106
 This, again, finds parallel in the United States, 
where one trial court judge and one appellate judge from each of the 
regional circuits is appointed to the JCUS.
107
 This would ensure that the 
Council will not be dominated by those close to the power structure in 
Kathmandu, and that problems and issues unique to one province or region 
would not be overlooked by a Council unaware and unacquainted with 
such problems. 
With a Judicial Council dominated by judges, and selected by their 
fellow judges, the Council is well positioned to function as a truly 
independent branch of government. Council members will not ―owe their 
seat‖ to anyone outside the judiciary, and any agenda of the judges who 
elected them is likely to include the fundamental interests of the judiciary, 
e.g., structural protections for judicial independence, adequate funding for 
the judiciary, caseload equalization, and so forth. Generous, if not 
proportional, representation of trial court judges and judges from the 
different regions or provinces of Nepal would also help to diversify the 
Judicial Council and make it more responsive to the broad-ranging issues 
and needs throughout the judicial system. 
11. Non-judge Membership on the Judicial Council—Lawyers  
Of course, one of the drawbacks to a Judicial Council dominated by 
judges is that the council‘s priorities may focus too much on the comforts 
and emoluments of the judges themselves, with inadequate attention to the 
needs and interests of stakeholders outside the judiciary, including 
litigants. In the United States, for example, one of the top priorities for the 
JCUS (an all-judge council), and consequently its administrative staff, has 
been increasing the pay of the judges.
108
 It is worth noting that most of the 
international declarations and ―best practices‖ speak of councils on which 
 
 
 106. The number and configuration of provinces within Nepal is an open question at present, but 
will likely to be established in the new constitution. See Constitution 2010 Supplement, What the 
Geographers Say, NEPALI TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at 7, available at http://www.nepalitimes.com.np/ 
issue/2009/04/17/ConstitutionSupplement/15864/print. My suggestion that there may ultimately be 
five provincial authorities is mere speculation, reflecting the recommendations of Chandra Bahadur 
Shrestha, ―If we could make the existing five development regions the new provinces it will be easier 
to gauge the kind of resources available and integrate the regions properly,‖ id., and Dr. Timalsena, 
―There should not be more than 5 provincial high courts,‖ infra note 116, at 9. 
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). 
 108. Tony Mauro, Judicial Salaries at Top of Court Administrator's Agenda, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 
9, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1168263429718. 
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judges form a ―substantial‖ or even majority membership, but do not 
occupy all posts on the council.
109
  
So who else should serve on the Judicial Council? One of the most 
obvious appointments is that of a lawyer representing the bar. An all-judge 
council may not fully represent the interests of the bar or the litigants in 
the system. The Interim Constitution already calls for one member of the 
bar: ―A senior advocate, appointed by the Chief Justice on 
recommendation of the Nepal Bar Association.‖110 While this is only one 
member, it presently constitutes twenty percent of the entire Judicial 
Council. If Council membership is expanded, broadened, and diversified, 
bar representation should be similarly expanded. Consistent with the 
discussion above, however, it should be made clear that the Chief Justice 
is not free to disregard recommendations and make his or her own 
selection.  
In the spirit of broadening and diversifying the Council, it may be 
worth looking beyond the Nepal Bar Association. If Nepal has more than 
one viable bar association, it may be appropriate to expand the Judicial 
Council to include selections from the others.
111
 This would expand 
membership and appropriately dilute the Prime Minister‘s influence. 
As noted above, Brazil has amended its constitution to create a judicial 
council featuring not only two lawyers but two prosecutors as well (on a 
council of fifteen, nine of whom are judges). For Nepal, though, this could 
be a problematic provision. On the one hand, prosecutors may bring 
valuable perspective to the issues of court function and operation that a 
Judicial Council must contend with. However, two concerns cut the other 
way. First, to the extent that the prosecutors are part of the Ministry of 
Justice, an executive branch agency, this would only increase executive 
branch influence over the judiciary. Second, to the extent that the Judicial 
Council selects judges, the prosecutors may be ―biased‖ in the selection of 
judges—opting for candidates they perceive to be pro-prosecution, which 
could skew the selection process, particularly if corresponding seats are 
not reserved for defense counsel.  
 
 
 109. See, e.g., supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 110. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 113, § 1(c) (2007). 
 111. It may be possible to include, for example, the Kathmandu District Court Bar Association, 
see http://www.kathmandubar.org.np (last visited July 3, 2009), Nepal‘s Supreme Court Bar 
Association, or perhaps others, in nominating lawyers to serve on the Judicial Council.  
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12. Non-judge Membership on the Judicial Council—The Legal 
Academy  
It is also advisable to include one or more representatives of academia 
on the Judicial Council. The deans of the law schools in Nepal might be in 
a position to serve as members of the Judicial Council or to nominate 
others from their respective faculties to serve. Academics usually 
command a degree of respect in the legal community, and can contribute 
much to the principled administration of the judiciary. Because academic 
freedom is a value highly prized in the educational establishment, we can 
expect the representatives of the academy to demonstrate and model 
independence in the performance of their duties. Most critically, their 
inclusion would help ensure that the Judicial Council did not function as a 
monolithic alter ego of the Prime Minister, the risk that the current regime 
bears, but instead, as a deliberative body reflecting the diverse concerns of 
institutions and individuals involved with and affected by the judicial 
system. 
13. Non-judge Membership on the Judicial Council—Lay Persons 
Again, Brazil‘s judicial council calls for ―two laymen appointed by the 
legislature.‖112 There is certainly potential to round out the Nepali Judicial 
Council‘s membership with lay persons, but when the sole qualification is 
―lay person,‖ it raises questions about who should be selected. The 
legislature may not be the best authority to appoint such persons, 
particularly if we are trying to maintain institutional independence and 
separation of powers. This may be an avenue toward introducing 
geographical proportionality, however, if the local government or judiciary 
of each of the five provinces were empowered to appoint a lay person to 
the judicial council.
113
 Whether this idea has merit for Nepal depends on 
whether there are prominent, respected, trustworthy citizens available to 
fill those roles, and whether the provincial governments are likely to 
appoint individuals who could and would act independently of political 
pressures. 
 
 
 112. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 111 n.35. 
 113. See supra note 106. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/4
  
 
 
 
 
2010] POST-MONARCHY JUDICIARY IN NEPAL 309 
 
 
 
 
14. Judicial Council Best Practices—Summary 
Autheman and Elena distill seven key principles that should govern any 
judicial council: 
 Independence, transparency, and accountability—Judicial 
councils must be independent bodies and operate in a transparent 
and accountable manner. 
 Structure—The structure, powers and processes of judicial 
councils must be designed to safeguard and promote judicial 
independence. If adequate checks and balances are not in place, a 
judicial council may become a pawn in the hands of the executive, 
legislative and/or powerful groups, thereby undermining judicial 
independence. 
 Adequate resources—Judicial councils must be granted adequate 
human and financial resources. 
 Composition—While the exact composition of judicial councils 
varies greatly from country to country and depends on existing 
obstacles to judicial independence, there is an emerging consensus 
among judges, legal scholars, and practitioners that judicial councils 
should be composed of a majority of judges and that Councils with 
broad representation may function more fairly and independently. 
 Judicial membership—Judicial members of a judicial council 
should be elected by their peers rather than appointed by the 
legislature or executive. The selection process should be transparent 
and provide for civil society participation and oversight. 
 Powers—Judicial councils around the world have varying 
powers which range from judicial administration to decisions 
affecting the judicial career, but there is an emerging consensus that 
where they exist they should be responsible for the judicial selection 
process and contribute to the promotion, discipline and/or training 
of judges. 
 Monitoring and reporting—The decision-making process of a 
judicial council should be transparent and allow for civil society 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
310 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:283 
 
 
 
 
participation and oversight. Mechanisms to monitor judicial council 
operations must be put in place and effectively implemented.
114
 
 In keeping with these principles, some of which have been discussed 
in much more detail above, it is clear that there is no ―one-size-fits-all‖ 
solution. There are a variety of ways to compose councils and to allocate 
authority and responsibility for court governance. While there may be no 
one right way to compose a council, there are certainly wrong ways to do 
it. Compliance with the seven enumerated principles above is important to 
avoid such mistakes. 
Indeed, one of the most glaring problems with Nepal‘s Interim 
Constitution relates to its provisions for the powers and composition of the 
Judicial Council. The essential reforms needed in the new constitution are 
(1) to empower the Council, so it is not limited to giving advice and 
making recommendations, and (2) to broaden and diversify the Council‘s 
membership, distancing it from the influence of the Prime Minister, 
thereby affording a measure of independence to the third branch of 
government and the judges in it. The specific measures set forth above, 
such as having a majority of the Council come from the judicial ranks, 
elected by their peers, are merely examples of how that membership by be 
broadened and insulated from executive influence. The specific reforms 
discussed here are mere possibilities, useful and meaningful only because 
they serve the larger purpose of promoting independence and 
accountability in the Nepali judiciary. 
B. Institutional Judicial Independence—Judiciary Budgets 
Control over judiciary budgets carries with it a certain power over the 
judicial branch overall. In any country, and under any constitution, the 
judicial branch is beholden to the other branches of government for its 
budgetary allocation, and this, in turn, has the potential to adversely 
impact the independence of the third branch. Catering to the political 
priorities of the political branches of government could well become the 
only way for the judiciary to secure adequate resources for the upcoming 
budget cycle. 
This is difficult to control constitutionally, but it may be possible to 
include a minimum allocation for the judicial branch in the constitution.
115
 
 
 
 114. AUTHEMAN & ELENA, supra note 70, at 16. 
 115. This type of minimum allocation is not unheard of in constitutions. The Indonesian 
Constitution requires that at least twenty percent of its annual budget be allocated to education. See 
Desy Nurhayati, Govt to Raise Spending on Education Next Year, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 14, 2008, 
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For example, the constitution could provide that three percent of the total 
national budget must be allocated to the judicial branch, to be used as 
directed by the Judicial Council. Dr. Ram Krishna Timalsena, Registrar of 
the Supreme Court of Nepal, has observed: 
Over the years the trend of fixing the judicial budget in the 
constitution is increasing [as a means to avoid] executive and 
legislative influence and domination [of] the judiciary. If we 
examine the world trend[,] two to six percent of [a given] national 
budget is allocated to the judiciary. Some . . . countries prescribe 
this [in the] national constitution itself.
116
  
 Timalsena recommends that the constitution specify a judicial budget 
of ―at least two percent of the national budget,‖117 a modest 
recommendation prompted by pragmatic politics. Since the Nepali 
judiciary has been allocated between 0.5% and 0.6% of the national 
budget in recent years, suggesting anything more than two percent would 
be unrealistic, if not impolitic.
118
  
A constitutional minimum could become a de facto maximum, 
however, as the legislature may be tempted to ignore the actual needs of 
the judiciary and merely allocate what the courts are entitled to under the 
constitution. If the international norms are indeed ―two to six percent,‖119 
the two percent minimum suggested by Timalsena may well do more harm 
than good, if it virtually guarantees an underfunded judiciary in the future. 
 
 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/14/govt-raise-spending-education-next-year.html. In 
Latin America, at least, such provisions have ensured minimum funding levels to judiciaries as well. 
See infra note 119. 
 116. Ram Krishna Timalsena, Designing Judiciary in the Process of Constitution Making 10 (Feb. 
14, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
 117. Id.  
 118. E-mail from Ram Krishna Timalsena, Registrar of the Supreme Court of Nepal (June 18, 
2009 3:33 CST) (on file with author). 
 119. Timalsena, supra note 116, at 10. The six percent figure comes from Costa Rica, where it is a 
constitutional minimum for funding the third branch of government. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF COSTA RICA art. 177 (amended 2003) (―The budget shall allocate to the Judicial Branch an amount 
of no less than six percent (6%) of the ordinary income estimated for the fiscal year.‖); Timalsena, 
supra note 118, at 10. See also CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY art. 249 (1992) (―The 
judicial branch will have its own budget. . . . [in] an amount that will not be lower than 3 percent of the 
central government‘s budget.‖); NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, 
art. 254 (1999): 
The functional, financial and administrative autonomy of the Judicial Power is established. To 
this end, in the general budget of the State an annual variable entry will be assigned to the 
system of justice, for its effective functioning, which will not be less than two per cent of the 
national ordinary budget, [and] which cannot be reduced or modified without prior 
authorization of the National Assembly. 
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On balance, however, particularly given the historical underfunding of the 
judiciary in Nepal, a constitutional minimum funding level could serve 
effectively to protect institutional independence of the judiciary. While a 
closer inquiry should be made to determine the appropriate minimum to 
ensure the adequacy of that allocation, some such minimum should be 
formalized in the constitution. It may also be helpful, rhetorically at least, 
for the constitution to specify a maximum as well, e.g., to state that the 
budget for the judiciary should be ―between two and four percent‖ of the 
total budget. This should help keep the constitutional minimum from 
becoming a de facto maximum. 
C. Institutional Judicial Independence—Emergency Powers 
Consistent with rule of law principles, no one should be ―above the 
law,‖ and the courts should have jurisdiction over legal issues.120 There are 
a number of places where the Interim Constitution specifically states that 
the courts have no jurisdiction, and most of them are legitimate provisions 
where the exercise of judicial authority would undermine separation of 
powers. For example, the judiciary cannot entertain the question of 
whether the legislature‘s internal proceedings are ―regular.‖121 
The exception which is most troubling is the Emergency Power Article 
allowing rights under the Interim Constitution to be suspended.
122
 Under 
this provision, the government can suspend rights to speech, assembly, 
association, press freedom, property, due process, information, privacy, 
and constitutional remedy.
123
 It also provides that ―no petition may be 
made in any court of law, nor any question be raised for the enforcement 
of the fundamental rights conferred by‖ these articles.124  
To deprive the courts entirely of jurisdiction over the suspension of 
such rights could seriously undermine judicial power at the very time it is 
needed most. ―Courts are seen as the bulwarks that safeguard rights and 
freedoms against encroachment by the state. As exigencies tend to test the 
 
 
 120. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009) (―Rule of Law . . . [t]he doctrine that 
every person is subject to the ordinary law within the jurisdiction . . . .‖). All of the definitions of ―rule 
of law‖ include some variant of this element—that the law applies equally to everyone, even the king 
or ruler. See STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 45, at 70. 
 121. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 77, § 2(2007). 
 122. Id. art. 143, § 7. 
 123. These rights are found in articles 12, 15, 19, 24, 25, 27, 28 and 32 of the Interim Constitution 
of Nepal, but are not among the itemized list of rights specifically exempted from suspension in article 
143, section 7. 
 124. Id. art. 143, § 8 (emphasis added).  
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protection of such rights and freedoms, courts are expected to be evermore 
vigilant in a time of emergency.‖125  
 While it may be appropriate to suspend certain rights temporarily in 
time of crisis or war,
126
 the courts should certainly be gatekeepers to 
ensure that emergency powers are not abused. The legitimacy of the 
proclamation or order relating to the state of emergency, and the attendant 
suspension of rights should not be placed beyond the scope of judicial 
review.
127
  
The downside of emergency powers is significant, as the constitutional 
protections of basic human rights may be illusory if it is too easy to 
suspend them. It is worth noting that the Nazis‘ rise to power in Germany 
and the horrific abuses of human rights that occurred there in the 1930s 
and 1940s were all fully constitutional, carried out as exercises of 
emergency power: 
The [Weimar] Constitution‘s main weakness was Article 48, which 
gave the president power to take control of the Reichstag in the 
event of a national emergency and exercise the Reichstag‟s power 
. . . . Article 48 allowed the president to disband the Reichstag, 
appoint a chancellor without a majority approval of the Reichstag, 
and make presidential decrees in emergency situations.
128
 
 
 
 125. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional? 
112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1034 (2003). Gross complains that courts are too deferential to the executive 
branch in times of war, and that their check on executive power is therefore inadequate. The Nepali 
Interim Constitution, however, goes even further. By depriving the courts of jurisdiction as to certain 
rights, it ensures that there will be no check at all on the executive‘s exercise of emergency power to 
suspend such rights. 
 126. Dominic McGoldrick, The Interface Between Public Emergency Powers and International 
Law, 2 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 380, 385 (2004) (―[T]here can be emergency situations in which derogation 
from . . . rights can be justified. In terms of historical experience and international practice, this is a 
realistic view.‖) (citations omitted). 
 127. Professor Dyzenhaus argues that the judiciary is under an obligation to impose rule of law on 
matters of national security unless the legislature explicitly tells the judiciary, in its formal declaration 
of a state of emergency, ―that [the legislature] wants government to govern outside of the rule of law.‖ 
David Dyzenhaus, Intimations of Legality Amid the Clash of Arms, 2 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 244, 268 
(2004). Dyzenhaus bases this exception to judicial obligation on the realization that ―the rule of law 
will require the cooperation of all three branches of government‖ and judges must assume that the 
other two branches are, in fact, cooperating. Id. He goes on to point out that while an executive may 
successfully act against the law, ―for judges to validate such . . . actions would be for them to confuse 
power with authority.‖ Id. In other words, judges have an important role to play in evaluating the 
legality of exercises of emergency power. 
 128. Jessica Russ, Nazi Germany: A Substantive View of Rule of Law 6–7 (2009) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (citing Karl Dietrich Bracher, The Technique of the National Socialist 
Seizere of Power, in THE PATH TO DICTATORSHIP, 1918–1933, at 117–19 (1964)). 
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 Hitler was able to wield power, initially through his role as 
chancellor, and subvert parliamentary rule through intra-constitutional 
means, thanks to article 48.
129
 The lesson here is that an emergency 
powers provision can open the door to serious abuse of power and 
subversion of the very rights the constitution ought to protect. 
There is a history of such abuse in Nepal. In 1960 the monarchy seized 
control of the country, dissolving the parliamentary government and 
setting aside the constitution that created it, in an exercise of emergency 
power. The effect of that state of emergency continued for thirty years 
before a new constitution restoring a multi-party parliamentary system was 
drawn up in 1990.
130
 States of emergency were declared again in 2001 and 
2005, the latter after the monarchy seized complete control of the 
country.
131
 It is worth noting that these have not been temporary and 
limited suspensions of rights under the constitution, but complete 
usurpations of power by monarchs who dismissed out of hand the reality 
as well as the concept of constitutional government. Having been stung by 
such abuse of emergency powers in the past, Nepal should be especially 
wary of leaving that back door open in its new constitution. 
1. Suggested Constitutional Provisions for Emergency Power—Right 
to Challenge the Exercise of Such Power before the Supreme Court 
The new constitution needs to preserve the power of the judiciary to 
review the constitutionality of exercises of emergency power as a check on 
the abuse of such power. At present, the only check on that power is in the 
legislative branch, which must approve it within one month if it is to 
continue for the maximum, renewable, three-month period.
132
 A 
significant amount of damage can be done during that first month—
arguably too long a period to begin with—even if the legislature does not 
ultimately approve the Order or Proclamation. Moreover, the legislature is 
not the best branch of government to check the executive in this area, 
particularly because in a parliamentary system, the executive branch is 
reflective of parliamentary majorities. Only an independent judicial branch 
can serve to protect the rights of unpopular minorities, political or 
otherwise, against an abuse of emergency powers. 
 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. See supra Part I.  
 131. Id. 
 132. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 143, §§ 2, 3 (2007). 
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Accordingly, article 143, section 2 of the Interim Constitution should 
be amended to allow a challenge to a particular exercise of emergency 
power in an expedited proceeding before the Supreme Court. Consistent 
with this addition, the present article 143, section 8, which deprives the 
courts of jurisdiction over exercises of emergency power, should be 
stricken. 
2. Amendments as to Specific Rights 
The Interim Constitution appropriately specifies certain rights that are 
not subject to derogation in an exercise of emergency power, including: 
Article 13—Right to Equality 
Article 14—Right Against Untouchability and Racial 
Discrimination 
Article 16—Right Regarding Environment and Health 
Article 17—Education and Cultural Right 
Article 18—Right Regarding Employment and Social Security 
Article 20—Right of Woman 
Article 21—Right to Social Justice 
Article 22—Right of Child 
Article 23—Right to Religion 
Article 26—Right Against Torture 
Article 29—Right Against Exploitation 
Article 30—Right Regarding Labour 
Article 31—Right Against Exile133 
This listing, however, does not go far enough. Article 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (―ICCPR‖), acceded 
to by Nepal in August 1991,
134
 states specifically that emergency powers 
may be invoked in derogation of fundamental human rights only ―to the 
 
 
 133. Id. art. 143, § 7. 
 134. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications 
of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (as of 9 June 2004), available at http://cjei.org/ 
publications.html (follow link entitled ―NB List of countries and treaties ratified Ratification report 
(PDF)‖). 
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extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,‖ adding that this 
does not include invidious discrimination or violation of other 
international obligations.
135
 This language is decidedly stricter than that in 
the Interim Constitution, which allows ―necessary orders to meet the 
exigencies.‖136  
Moreover, there are other non-derogable rights under the ICCPR that 
should be included on this list, lest the constitution be in conflict with 
Nepal‘s treaty obligations under the ICCPR:137 
Article 24—Rights Regarding to Justice [sic], including procedural 
due process (subsections 1, 8) 
 right to counsel (subsections 2, 10) 
 speedy trial (subsection 3) 
 right against ex post facto application of laws (subsection 4) 
 presumption of innocence (subsection 5) 
 double jeopardy (subsection 6) 
 self-incrimination (subsection (7)) 
 fair trial (subsection (9)) 
Article 25—Right against Preventive Detention 
Article 32—Right to Constitutional Remedy138 
For example, the bar on ex post facto laws is non-derogable under the 
ICCPR articles 4 and 15,
139
 and yet the Interim Constitution not only 
allows the suspension of those rights,
140
 but deprives the judiciary of 
 
 
 135. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 136. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 143, § 6 (2007). 
 137. McGoldrick, supra note 126, at 386: 
[T]here is a general principle of international law that a state cannot rely on its constitution, 
constitutional order, or other internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. . . . 
The options for a state with a constitutional incompatibility are (1) not to become a party to 
the treaty or (2) to enter a reservation if that is legally possible, or (3) to change the 
constitution. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 138. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL arts. 24, 25, 32 (2007).  
 139. ICCPR, supra note 135, arts. 4, 15. 
 140. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 143, § 7 (2007). Suspension of this right granted 
under art. 24, § (4) is not prohibited. ―No person shall be punished for an act which was not punishable 
by law when the act was committed, nor shall any person be subjected to a punishment greater than 
that prescribed by the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.‖ Id. 
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jurisdiction to review the suspension of the same.
141
 While preventive 
detention may be one of the primary tools in restoring order during a state 
of emergency, there seems to be little justification for denying those 
detained a right to challenge such detention in the courts. The right to 
constitutional remedy should not be derogated simply because the 
executive has, rightly or wrongly, declared an emergency.
142
 The rule of 
law requires that constitutional safeguards remain in place, and that 
emergency powers exceptions be justified according to law, on 
constitutional terms.
143
  
D. Institutional Judicial Independence—Annual Reports 
The Interim Constitution calls for the Supreme Court to submit annual 
reports including: 
the quantitative descriptions of the cases registered in the Supreme 
Court and other subordinate courts, 
the number of disposed and pending cases, out of the of [sic] cases 
registered as stated in sub-clause (a) above, and the reason for 
pending thereon, 
details of new precedents propounded by the Supreme Court, 
number of cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, 
description of the judicial comment made by the Supreme Court, if 
any, on the maters of competency regarding the conduct of judicial 
duty of judge [sic] of a court subordinate to it, 
 
 
 141. Id. art. 143, § 8. 
 142. The Editors, Emergency Powers and Constitutionalism, 2 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 207, 208–09 
(2004): 
 The consensus [i]s that courts should try to protect citizens‘ rights, chiefly by assuming 
that government was operating according to the usual standards and forcing those accountable 
to alter the rules explicitly, if need be. In other words, although courts might be powerless to 
avoid abuses during times of emergency, and even if it is inappropriate for the judiciary to 
stunt the governmental power essential to resolving an emergency, courts still should do their 
utmost to ensure that recourse to emergency powers itself is granted in a democratically 
legitimate manner. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . [E]ven if democratic government must yield to an emergency, actors ought to take 
care to preserve the formal structure that makes it appear as though democratic 
constitutionalism is operating. While such an appearance might be only ―formal,‖ it retains 
value nonetheless. By treating emergency powers as pursuant to democratic government, and 
not in opposition to it, all actors remain clear that the appropriate norm is constitutionalism. 
 143. See id. 
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amount of fines and penalties reimbursed, 
description on the implementation of a decision, 
the budget appropriated to the Supreme Court and subordinate 
courts, and statement of expenditures.
144
 
Annual reports such as these are important for accountability; they ensure 
that courts take seriously their responsibilities and account for the work 
they have done over the year.  
The problem with this reporting requirement in the Interim 
Constitution is that it requires the report to go to the Prime Minister; the 
Prime Minister, in turn ―submit[s] such reports before the Legislature-
Parliament.‖145 While it is largely symbolic, this provision does serious 
violence to the concepts of judicial independence and accountability. 
While the constitution should require the judiciary to publish its annual 
report—ensuring transparency in general, the requirement in the Interim 
Constitution to submit the report to the Prime Minister suggests that the 
judiciary is directly answerable or accountable to the Prime Minister. A 
truly independent judiciary would not be. 
A more defensible approach would be to have the judiciary report to 
the legislature—in this case the Constituent Assembly (―CA‖)—because it 
is the CA after all that appropriates the judiciary‘s budget. It is not 
unreasonable to expect a judiciary to account to the appropriating authority 
how last year‘s budget was used, what was accomplished, and so on. This 
is the reporting line established in the Palermo Declaration: ―Each year the 
. . . Council . . . provides Parliament with a report on its activities and on 
the state of justice.‖146 Of course, notwithstanding funding mechanisms, 
the judicial branch is not subordinate to the legislature either.  
Accordingly, the best approach is to have the constitutional provisions 
related to Annual Reports require merely that the report be published in a 
public forum and that copies of the report be provided to both the 
legislature and executive. In proper perspective, the judiciary‘s 
accountability is to the public in general and not to any other branch of 
government; the language of the constitution should reflect that. 
 
 
 144. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 117, § 2 (2007). 
 145. Id. art. 117, § 1. 
 146. Palermo Declaration, supra note 69, § 3.4 (emphasis added). 
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E. Decisional Judicial Independence—Life Tenure 
Nothing in the Interim Constitution specifically calls for life tenure for 
judges—it is silent on the topic of the term of office.147 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the concept of life tenure is assumed and 
implemented in practice. Judicial independence requires that judges enjoy 
some security in their jobs and that they need not worry about possible 
dismissal or getting passed over for reappointment. Accordingly, the new 
constitution should be more explicit in guaranteeing life tenure, or at least 
long terms of office.
148
  
F. Decisional Judicial Independence—Judicial Compensation 
Judicial salaries and compensation are important for a variety of 
reasons, as they are directly related to judicial independence and judicial 
integrity. There is already a prohibition on the receipt of gratuities, which 
is important in terms of maintaining integrity.
149
 While the actual 
remuneration to be paid—in Nepali Rupees—will not be set in the 
constitution,
150
 there are a variety of guarantees that can and should be 
included in the new constitution.  
1. No Diminution of Salary 
Judicial independence requires that judges be insulated from any 
diminution of salary while in office. Presumably the legislature will have 
power over budgets and, therefore, salaries, but power to reduce judicial 
salaries would carry with it power to intimidate the judiciary, doing 
violence to judicial independence. The Interim Constitution includes such 
a provision now, stating the ―remuneration, privileges, and other 
 
 
 147. The Constitution contains no provision establishing a specific term of office or a time limit 
on a judge‘s appointment.  
 148. In the United States, federal bankruptcy judges serve terms of fourteen years, so 
reappointment is likely to come up only once in a career; for most of that time, the judge need not 
worry about how his or her decisions may or may not please the appointing authority. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 152(a)(1) (2006). Additionally, the appointment and reappointment of bankruptcy judges are done by 
Article III judges, who are already insulated from political pressures due to their own life-tenure. 
§ 152(a)(4) (―The United States court of appeals for the circuit within which such a territorial district 
court is located may appoint bankruptcy judges under this chapter . . . .‖).  
 149. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 104, § 3 (2007). 
 150. Establishing monetary amounts in a constitution is a poor approach to drafting such 
documents, as inflation quickly renders such values obsolete. For example, the Seventh Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution which, in an effort to avoid the expense of jury empanelment for small claims, 
stated that the right to a jury in a civil trial is available only for legal claims amounting to more than 
twenty dollars. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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conditions of service [of the judges] . . . shall not be altered to their 
disadvantage.‖151 Such provisions are vital and should be retained. 
2. Adequate Salaries 
There are compelling reasons that judicial salaries should be 
substantial. First, a well-paid judiciary will be far less vulnerable to 
bribery, kick-backs, or other corruption.
152
 In countries where judges and 
law enforcement officials have been paid poorly, not only is there a strong 
temptation to take bribes, there is likely to be far greater public acceptance 
of the fact that such officials do indulge in financial self-dealing.
153
 After 
all, they have to feed their families somehow. 
Second, a substantial salary sends the public and the bar a strong 
message that judgeships are desirable positions, worthy of trust and 
respect. This will strengthen the judiciary, as public perception of judges 
will change as people consider the status that goes with the office of judge. 
Third is the closely related principle that a high judicial salary, and the 
social and professional respect that come with it, will attract more talented 
and competent individuals into these positions. When judgeships are well 
paid and highly regarded, the best and the brightest legal minds will aspire 
to be judges, and the quality of the system will improve overall.
154
 
Fourth, a high salary, particularly a dramatically increased salary, will 
signal a shift from the past. It will punctuate the message that far more will 
be expected of judges appointed under the new constitution than has been 
expected of them in the past, in terms of ethics, responsibility, and 
productivity.
155
  
 
 
 151. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 104, § 4, art. 109, § 8 (2007). 
 152. See David Pimentel, Restructuring the Courts: In Search of Basic Principles for the 
Judiciary of Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 107, 114 (2008) (In Bosnia, salaries 
were increased three- to five-fold as a part of the judicial reform.). 
 153.  
Interviewees participating in a study [in Moldova] in 2002 expressed the view that accepting 
nonofficial payments was just a matter of job compensation for public officials. Transparency 
International concluded that this may evidence public acceptance of the phenomenon of 
administrative corruption. (Transparency International, ―Corruption and Access to the 
Judiciary,‖ 2002.) In the environment of a small country such as Moldova with a protracted 
history of corruption, such perceptions die hard. 
DEMOCRACY INT‘L, IFES, & DPK CONSULTING, MOLDOVA ANTI-CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT FINAL 
REPORT 6–7 (2006), http://www.ifes.org/publication/5442f82d638cca2a5453c6a801e95342/Moldova 
Anti-Corr.pdf. 
 154. See Pimentel, supra note 152, at 115 (―These highly desirable posts [the new judgeships in 
the restructured courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina]with greater powers, for the most part, and with a 
far higher salarywould attract the best and brightest of the Bosnian legal community.‖). 
 155. See id. at 115 (―[T]he appointments [to these highly desirable posts] could be reserved for 
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The constitution itself may be able to guarantee a substantial salary for 
judges if it indexes the judicial salary in some manner. Just as a minimal 
level of funding for the judiciary as a whole can be ensured by making 
funding a percentage of overall budgets, we should be able to set an index 
for judicial salaries as well. For example, in the United States, it has been 
a longstanding practice (although not a constitutional requirement) to tie 
federal judicial salaries to Congressional salaries.
156
 When Congressional 
salaries go up, judicial salaries do too.
157
 If the salaries of Nepal‘s CA 
members are substantial, it may be appropriate for the constitution to 
specify that judicial salaries will match (or be indexed to) them. Thus as 
the CA regulates its own salaries, it will automatically ensure that judicial 
salaries will keep pace. 
Another approach may be for the constitution to establish a separate 
judicial compensation commission, tasked with setting appropriate salaries 
for judicial officers. Such a commission has been established in 
Bangladesh and has made recommendations for enhancements of judicial 
compensation.
158
 The commission needs real power to be effective, 
though; little will be achieved if the commission‘s recommendations can 
be ignored.
159
  
G. Decisional Judicial Independence—Removal 
The Interim Constitution provides for removal of otherwise life-tenured 
judges based on voluntary resignation,
160
 reaching the mandatory 
 
 
those who were above reproach, untainted by the more dubious aspects of the judiciary‘s history 
. . . .‖). 
 156. SHARON S. GRESSLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., JUDICIAL SALARY-SETTING POLICY (Mar. 25, 
2003), http://www.congressproject.org/judicialsalaries.pdf (referencing ―the current rate linkages‖ and 
observing, ―Currently, salaries of district court judges, Members of Congress, and Level II of the 
Executive Schedule are in parity.‖).  
 157. This approach has been severely criticized by the federal judiciary, which believes that this 
provision keeps federal judicial salaries artificially low. Elected officials are reluctant to vote 
themselves a pay increase, as this makes them look bad to the taxpaying public when they run for re-
election. That reluctance serves to keep judicial salaries from keeping pace with inflation.  
 Judges have long argued that when Congress does not even give them cost-of-living 
adjustments—none was given last year, or in several years during the 1990s—it is, in effect 
violating the salary-reduction provision of the Constitution. Real earnings of judges have 
declined by nearly 25 percent since 1969, [Chief Justice John] Roberts pointed out. 
Mauro, supra note 108. 
 158. Mukta, supra note 59.  
 159. The Bangladeshi government, in fact, rejected the judicial pay commission‘s first 
recommendations. Id. 
 160. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 105, § 1(a), art. 109, § 10(a) (2007). 
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retirement age,
161
 death,
162
 or misconduct.
163
 This last provision is the one 
that deserves the most attention, as it applies to decisional judicial 
independence. Article 105 specifies that the Chief Justice and judges of 
the Supreme Court can be removed by impeachment, which is a resolution 
passed in the CA.
164
 Other judges can be removed by the Chief Justice, 
following a ―decision‖ by the Judicial Council ―for reasons of 
incompetence, misbehavior or failure to discharge the duties of his/her 
office in good faith, incapa[city] to discharge the duties due to physical or 
mental condition, or deviation to justice.‖165 
The concern here, of course, is whether the threat of removal will 
interfere with judges‘ exercise of decisional independence on the bench. 
Whoever has the power to remove can abuse that power, and judicial 
independence will suffer. For Supreme Court judges, there is some 
protection, because nothing short of legislative action will remove them. It 
is such a major undertaking, one presumes, that it would be undertaken 
rarely, and only in the most egregious cases. That has certainly been the 
pattern in the U.S. federal courts, where judges are removable only by 
formal impeachment proceedings.
166
 
The provisions in the Interim Constitution for removing appellate and 
district court judges appear to offer few protections. The grounds for 
removal are vague at best. ―Deviation to justice‖ is a phrase of unknown 
meaning, but which could certainly be used to pursue a politically 
motivated removal of a judge based solely on the merits of that judge‘s 
 
 
 161. Id. art. 105, § 1(b), art. 109, § 10(b) (specifying mandatory retirement at age sixty-five for 
Supreme Court Justices and at age sixty-three for all other judges, respectively). 
 162. Id. art. 105, § 1(d), art. 109, § 10(d). 
 163. Id. art. 105, § 1(c), art. 109, § 10(c). 
 164. Id. art. 105, § 1(c). 
 165. Id. art. 109, § 10(c). The cited passage continues:  
The Judge . . . who is facing charge [sic] . . . shall be given a reasonable opportunity to defend 
himself/herself; and for this purpose, the Judicial Council may constitute a ―Committee of 
Inquiry‖ for the purposes of recording the statement of the Judge, collecting evidence and 
submitting its findings thereof.  
Id. 
 166. MARY VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT: NONE CALLED FOR JUSTICE 1 (1993):  
 Hundreds of impeachment resolutions have been introduced into the House of 
Representatives over the years, and some sixty or more were sufficiently serious that 
investigations were ordered. Before 1986, however, only thirteen actual impeachments were 
passed by the House and forwarded to the Senate for trial. . . . The sparing use of 
impeachment and trial over two hundred years of American history changed in the 1980s, and 
three federal judges were impeached, tried, and removed in as many years. Those cases 
brought the total of the judges actually convicted to seven of the twelve who had been 
impeached. The rusty machinery for impeachment and trial was dusted off and streamlined to 
cope with the new flurry of charges against miscreant federal judges. 
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decisions. Here is a prime example of why the Judicial Council must be 
constituted in a way that keeps it removed from political influence. Nepal 
needs a Council it can trust to invoke removal authority only in cases of 
serious misconduct, and not based on dissatisfaction with the merits of a 
judge‘s decisions. At the same time, this constitutional provision should be 
amended to eliminate the phrase ―deviation to justice‖ and define far more 
narrowly the permissible grounds for removal. 
The newly articulated grounds for removal should also avoid the term 
―incompetence,‖ which appears in the Interim Constitution.167 It, too, is a 
vague term which might be invoked on the basis of the merits of judicial 
decisions. Those who disagree with a judge‘s decisions might well 
condemn the judge as ―incompetent‖ and begin removal proceedings. At 
the same time, a judge whose physical or mental health has rendered her 
incapable of performing the duties of office should be subject to removal. 
A more useful standard for removal might be something along the lines of 
the language in the Iraqi Interim Constitution: ―No judge or member of the 
Higher Juridical Council may be removed unless he is convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude or corruption or suffers permanent 
incapacity.‖168 The phrase ―permanent incapacity‖ is far less vulnerable to 
abuse than the term ―incompetence‖. 
H. Decisional Judicial Independence—Judicial Immunity 
There does not appear to be any provision in the Interim Constitution 
affording judges immunity from suit for official actions taken as a judge. 
A provision should be included that affords judges this protection. This is 
important in order to promote an independent judiciary by relieving the 
judges of fear and undue influence: 
An independent and fearless judiciary is essential to the protection 
of the rights of the citizen—a judiciary that is free from harassment 
and undue influence from all quarters. The judges are the true 
guardians of the law, and they are the defenders of the citizen‘s 
liberties against potential attack from the authorities.
169
 
 
 
 167. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 109, § 10 (2007) (―Judges . . . shall be removed . . . 
for reasons of incompetence, misbehavior or failure to discharge the duties of his/her office in good 
faith, incapable to discharge the duties due to physical or mental condition, or deviation to justice.‖). 
 168. IRAQ INTERIM CONSTITUTION art. 47 (2004), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ 
iz00000_.html. 
 169. ABIMBOLA A. OLOWOFOYEKU, SUING JUDGES: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 2 (1993). 
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 If we hope for an independent Nepali judiciary, it will be important to 
include a provision granting ―immunity . . . from civil liability from the 
performance of judicial duties‖ in the new constitution. 170 
VI. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: LOWER COURTS AND REGIONAL STRUCTURE 
One of the most serious challenges for the rule of law is to bring it all 
the way to the people, to the ―person on the street.‖ Too often rule of law 
reform initiatives focus strictly on high-level initiatives, drafting 
constitutions or re-establishing Supreme Courts. The average person in her 
life has little or no contact with either a constitution or a Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, if the court system is going to be effective in helping to 
establish the rule of law in Nepal, it must be established in a way that 
touches the lives of the citizens on the ground. 
For this reason, it is recommended that the People‘s Courts, or an 
institution akin to them, be retained in the new constitution. The concept 
of low-cost, quick-result, easily accessible courts is important, lest citizens 
perceive the law as an empty vessel and despair at ever seeing justice, or 
worse, take the law into their own hands. To the extent that the People‘s 
Courts have not adhered to acceptable and accepted standards of justice, 
that should be corrected through appellate review, as well as a vetting and 
removal process akin to that described below for Nepal‘s district and 
appellate court judges.
171
 
Oversight of the People‘s Courts may well be entrusted to judicial 
councils established at the provincial level, which would be empowered to 
conduct the selection and appointment process and handle any disciplinary 
proceedings against People‘s Court judges. Dr. Timalsena, Registrar of the 
Supreme Court of Nepal, concurs that this type of decentralization makes 
sense, specifically advocating the creation of five separate provincial 
judicial councils: ―Judges of the provincial district and local courts should 
be appointed by [a] provincial judicial council, headed by the chief justice 
of the concerned provincial high court.‖172 
Although this idea did not originate in the United States, such a 
structure strongly reflects the structure of the U.S. federal courts. By 
statute in U.S. courts, ultimate administrative authority rests in the national 
Judicial Conference of the United States, but local authority, including 
authority over the appointment of U.S. Bankruptcy Judges and the 
 
 
 170. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 818 (9th ed. 2009). 
 171. Part VI, infra. 
 172. Timalsena, supra note 116, at 9. 
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discipline of all federal judges, is localized in the each Circuit Court of 
Appeals and its separate ―Circuit Council.‖173 
The upshot is that responsive and efficient adjudication at the lowest 
levels—providing access to justice even in rural and remote areas—can be 
the most vital aspect of establishing the rule of law. A system of regional 
administration may be the best way to effect that. 
VII. ETHICS AND CORRUPTION IN THE COURTS 
Not every concept for judicial reform or sound judicial structure need 
be canonized in the Constitution. Principles of operation and 
implementation can be every bit as important in ensuring that the judiciary 
can fulfill its appropriate function in Nepali society, as an independent 
branch of government implementing the rule of law. 
A. Vetting the Current Judges 
Corruption is cited repeatedly as one of the core problems plaguing the 
Nepali judiciary. Normally, a problem of corruption is an argument for 
less judicial independence, in the sense that accountability mechanisms 
must not be functioning effectively to prevent corruption.
174
 In a seriously 
corrupt environment, however, it may be desirable, or even necessary, to 
conduct a ―clean sweep‖ of the judiciary, in order to remove corrupt 
individuals and corrupt influences from the judiciary.
175
 A time of 
constitutional change, when the courts may be restructured anyway, is the 
perfect time to conduct such a house-cleaning, as demonstrated by the 
success of such a reform in post-war Bosnia.
176
 As to the issue of 
corruption, the Bosnian reform removed all judges from their posts and 
 
 
 173. Supra note 95, at 868. 
 174.  
The National Judicial Council must proceed with consummate care to maintain the delicate 
balance between independence and accountability. The concept of judicial independence will 
be drained of meaning and relevance if judges are corrupt. On no account should judicial 
independence operate to bar the National Judicial Council from investigating genuine and 
credible allegations of impropriety. Aggressive enforcement of judicial standards is necessary 
not only to ensure probity, but also to promote public confidence in the judicial process.  
Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the Problems and Failures 
of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 9, 60 (2005) (citations omitted). 
 175. David Pimentel, Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial 
Structure in Light of Judges‟ Courage and Integrity, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2009) (‖A 
judicial system full of monsters needs the power to ‗clean house‘: to, at the very least, send a strong 
message that bad judges risk consequences if they continue to pursue a pattern of corruption.‖); id. at 
31 n.97. 
 176. Pimentel, supra note 152, at 123–24.  
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invited them to apply and compete for the judgeships in the newly 
restructured courts, a drastic measure that was nonetheless deemed 
necessary: 
 The need to vet judges was driven by the widely perceived 
pattern of corruption and incompetence throughout the system, to 
which several factors contributed. 
 A threshold issue concerned judges‘ compensation, which was 
minimal considering the functions and responsibilities of the 
position. Judges were paid so little (the equivalent of a few hundred 
dollars a month) that they needed other sources of income merely to 
subsist. This, of course, created virtually irresistible incentives for 
judges to exploit their official position for financial advantage. Even 
legitimate business opportunities, pursued on the side, were prone to 
create conflicts of interest. 
 There were also concerns about the competence of judges, as it 
appeared that some had been appointed due to political connections, 
quite regardless of qualifications. It was perceived that some judges 
of marginal competence were appointed during the war as well, not 
necessarily out of corrupt favoritism, but simply because of the 
scarcity of competent candidates for appointment during the 
conflict. 
 Even the most qualified, competent, and ethical of the judges in 
the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovinafor they certainly were not 
all incompetent or corrupthad been working for years in a system 
characterized by low expectations. The reform effort needed a 
completely new culture of high expectations for judges‘ conduct, 
performance, and industry: an independent judiciary that would be a 
cornerstone of the rule of law in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
A reappointment process, by which judges had to compete for 
newly created judgeships, would help turn the page of history, 
creating a new culture in the court system, inaugurating a new 
judiciary untainted by the flaws or failings of its predecessor.
177
  
 If corruption in Nepal is as serious a problem as some say, such a 
dramatic transition may be a key element in establishing a judiciary 
independent enough to uphold the rule of law in Nepal. The constitution 
itself need not include provisions for re-staffing the bench, but those 
 
 
 177. Id. at 113–14 (citations omitted). 
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implementing the constitution should certainly consider this as a step in 
the implementation process. 
B. Establishing Accountability Mechanisms 
The best mechanism for ensuring integrity on the bench is careful 
screening in the judicial selection process. If we have judges we can trust, 
we can afford them great protections against interference. If we cannot 
trust our judges, we need a system that sacrifices some judicial 
independence to ensure that we can go after, and remove, the corrupt and 
incompetent on the bench.  
Any system, however, requires a mechanism for policing misconduct. 
That starts with a better definition of judicial misconduct. While it is not 
an element of the constitution, there should be a code of conduct for 
Nepali judges, so they and everyone else know what standards they are 
held to. A good place to start is the Bangalore Principles, adopted by the 
United Nations in 2006 as universal standards of judicial conduct.
178
  
In addition, there must be a mechanism for a person who observes 
unethical behavior by a judge to file a complaint, and bring it to the 
attention of the Judicial Council which, in turn, will be empowered to 
police the misconduct, and remove miscreant judges. The Judicial Council 
should draw up the procedure in some detail and publicize its availability, 
both to ensure that it is a meaningful accountability measure, and that the 
procedure is not abused to intimidate judges in their decision-making.
179
  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Nepal is at a crossroads, and the pending constitutional revision will set 
the stage for its future. To help the judiciary to play a proper and 
productive role in bringing peace, justice, and the rule of law to Nepal, 
however, certain provisions must be included in the new constitution. The 
 
 
 178. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct are annexed to U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council 
[ECOSOC], Res. 2006/23 (July 27, 2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/ 
corruption_judicial_res_e.pdf. The resolution ―[i]nvites Member States, consistent with their domestic 
legal systems, to encourage their judiciaries to take into consideration the Bangalore Principles . . . 
when reviewing or developing rules with respect to the professional and ethical conduct of members of 
the judiciary. . . .‖ Id. 
 179. See David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattle-Tale: Closing the Gap in Federal Judicial 
Discipline, 76 TENN. L. REV. 909 (2009) (summarizing the judicial discipline procedure and critiquing 
the effectiveness of the complaint procedures). The particulars of that process, however, are not 
appropriate for inclusion in the constitution itself and, therefore, fall outside the scope of this Article. 
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most critical of these are set forth in detail above and can be summarized 
under the following headings: 
Institutional Independence 
Judicial Council—Judicial appointments, administration and 
oversight should be handled by an independent body composed 
mostly, but not entirely, of judges; an ill-conceived Judicial Council 
may do more harm than good.  
Judiciary budgets—The judicial branch is, unavoidably, beholden to 
the other branches for its budgetary allocation, potentially affecting 
the judiciary‘s independence; accordingly the Constitution should 
guarantee minimum funding levels for the courts. 
Emergency powers—While it may be appropriate to suspend certain 
rights in time of crisis or war, the courts should be gatekeepers to 
ensure that the other branches do not abuse emergency powers; to 
deprive the courts entirely of jurisdiction over the suspension of 
rights would seriously undermine judicial power at the time the 
country needs it most. 
Annual reports—As a matter of form, the judiciary‘s annual report 
should not be made to any other branch of government, but 
published generally; the present provision creates the appearance 
that the courts are subservient, and answerable, to the Executive.  
Decisional Independence 
Life Tenure—Decisional judicial independence requires that judges 
enjoy some security in their positions; the new constitution should 
explicitly guarantee life tenure for judges.  
Judicial compensation—To secure independence for judges, 
constitutional safeguards must insulate judges from reduction in 
salary; but more than that, the Constitution should include indexing 
provisions to ensure the adequacy of judicial salaries to begin with.  
Judicial removal—The grounds for removal of a judge must be 
explicitly and narrowly drawn; vague standards for judicial 
discipline subject judges to politically motivated removal 
proceedings.  
Judicial immunity—The constitution must afford judges immunity 
from suit for official actions taken as a judge. 
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Other Rule of Law Priorities 
Access to justice—Whether or not the Maoists‘ ―People‘s Courts‖ 
are retained in their present form, the constitution must provide for 
responsive and efficient adjudication at the lowest levels—even in 
rural and remote areas; such access can be one of the most vital 
aspects of establishing the rule of law.  
Vetting of judges—If corruption is as serious a problem in the 
Nepali courts as reported, such a dramatic transition to a new 
constitution may be used to effect a renaissance of ethics and 
integrity in the judiciary; the constitution itself need not include 
provisions for vetting and re-staffing the bench, but these steps 
should be considered as part of the implementation process. 
Judicial ethics and discipline—Any system requires a mechanism 
for policing misconduct; this starts with a better articulation of 
minimum ethical standards; again this need not be spelled out in the 
Constitution, but the Constitution should call for a code of conduct 
to make clear to everyone the standards to which the judiciary is 
held, and how (or at least that) they will be enforced. 
 Special care should be taken in the pending constitutional drafting 
process to follow these principles if Nepal is to establish a judiciary that 
can function both accountably and independently. No constitutional 
provision can guarantee integrity in the judiciary, but flawed provisions 
can virtually guarantee its absence. The suggestions set forth above, most 
particularly with regard to the composition and powers of the Judicial 
Council, are drawn from the collective experience of judiciaries around the 
world. They reflect internationally recognized ―best practices.‖ The Nepali 
CDC would do well to learn from these practices and follow such 
principles in promoting an effective and independent judiciary. While 
these provisions may not be sufficient conditions, they may well be 
necessary conditions for achieving the rule of law in Nepal. 
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